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Al Qaeda’s ideology is not new; their critique of the existing political and social
order and vision for how to redeem the Muslim world builds on preexisting argu-
ments of several 20th century predecessors who called for an Islamic revolution that
would create a new order based on Islam. The persistence of revolutionary Islam
suggests that these ideas need to be countered in order to strike at the root of the
problem driving Islamically motivated terrorism and insurgency. U.S. efforts to
defeat Al Qaeda, however, continue to focus primarily on killing or capturing the
leadership, interdicting operations, and defensively bolstering the homeland and
U.S. assets against various types of attacks. In order to confront Al Qaeda’s ideol-
ogy, U.S. efforts should focus on indirectly fostering ‘‘a market place of ideas’’—the
space and culture of questioning and debating—in order to challenge the grievances
and solutions proposed by revolutionary Islam.
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‘‘The life of the Muslim Ummah is solely dependent on the ink of its
scholars and the blood of its martyrs.’’
—Sheikh Abdullah Azzam1
Following September 11th, the United States launched a Global War on
Terror that aimed to eradicate terrorist threats to the United States and its
interests. The principal target has been Al Qaeda. U.S. efforts to defeat Al
Qaeda have focused on killing or capturing the leadership, interdicting opera-
tions, and defensively bolstering the homeland and U.S. assets against various
types of attacks. Comparatively little effort—in money, manpower, and strategy—
has been put into countering Al Qaeda’s ideology, which is the inspiration for
its actions.
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Al Qaeda’s ideology, however, is not new. Its critique of the existing social and
political order and vision for how to redeem the Muslim world builds on preexisting
arguments of several 20th century predecessors who called for an Islamic revolution
that would create a new order based on Islam. The persistence of revolutionary Islam
suggests that these ideas need to be countered in order to strike at the root of the
problem driving Islamically motivated terrorism and insurgency. The U.S. govern-
ment has a limited but important role in fighting this ideology; directly confronting
Al Qaeda’s message is unlikely to work because the United States lacks credibility
and is not trusted by large portions of the Muslim world. The best avenue for the
U.S. to counter revolutionary Islam is to focus on indirectly fostering ‘‘a market
place of ideas’’—the space and culture of questioning and debating—in order to
challenge the grievances and solutions proposed by revolutionary Islam.
The article is divided into three sections. The first section constructs a three-part
definition of ideology—a critique on the current order, a set of beliefs for how the
world ought to be, and a course of action for realizing that better world. The second
section uses the definition of ideology to dissect Al Qaeda’s vision. And the third
section concludes with a discussion on the challenges of fighting each subcomponent
of revolutionary Islam’s ideology, arguing that creating the space and culture for
debating ideas is a useful means for undermining Al Qaeda’s vision for a better world
and how to get there.
Ideology—Critique, Vision, and Action
Ideology has many meanings, some contradictory to one another. This section draws
on literature from political philosophy to create a working definition of ideology,
stressing three subparts: a set of beliefs for how the world ought to be, a critique
of how the world currently is, and a course of action for realizing that world. From
this definition, the article then investigates the set of beliefs embodied in Al Qaeda’s
ideology.
Despite the disagreement over defining ideology, most scholars agree on the
term’s origins. Eighteenth century scholar Atoine Detutt de Tracy first used ideol-
ogy during the French Revolution to describe a new science of ideas that promised
to justly and rightly govern the new republic.2 Since coining the term, the study of
ideology has taken several trajectories. One direction focuses on the philosophical
aspects of ideology—such as its normative claims to truth and its epistemological
properties. Within this camp, ideologues such as Hegel and Marx, and de Tracy
before that, argue that human history is ever progressing towards perfection and
that it is only a matter of time and effort before false ideologies are discredited,
truth prevails, and ideological struggle ends. For Marx, the end of class struggle
and false ideologies means the end of ideology altogether. More recently, scholars
have argued that the discrediting of communist ideology and the persistence of
liberal democracy has brought about the ‘‘end of history,’’ meaning the end of
ideological struggle.3
Another approach to studying ideology looks more at its functional aspects as
a set of ideas that mobilizes and shapes human behavior. Political philosopher
Iain MacKenzie describes this as the study of ‘‘ideology as doing rather than as
knowing.’’4 Studying ideology from this perspective focuses more on its utility than
its truthfulness of source or knowledge. For example, Louis Althusser argues that
ideology has a ‘‘practico-social function’’ that bonds societies together.5 Another
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practical function of ideology is that it makes sense out of the world; it tells
individuals and societies who they are and who they ought to be.6
Iain MacKenzie argues that ideologies are particularly powerful because they
combine critiques of the current order and a vision for a better system: ‘‘Along
with a map of reality comes a picture of an ideal society. An ideology, then,
provides both an account of existing social and political relations and a blueprint
of how these relations ought to be organized.’’7 Political theorist Andrew Heywood
notes, ‘‘Ideologies are embraced less because they stand up to scrutiny and logical
analysis, and more because they help individuals, groups and societies to make
sense of the world in which they live.’’8 Ideology, therefore, contains valuable
insights into the mental landscape of its creators and those who embrace them;
it offers a glimpse into the dreams and aspirations of how they believe the world
ought to be and their paths for realizing that new world.
Finally, Heywood suggests that ideology is particularly powerful and important
to study because it fuses together the two worlds of thought and action: ‘‘[ideology]
straddles the conventional boundaries between descriptive and normative thought,
and between political theory and political practice . . . ideology therefore has a
powerful emotional or effective character: it is a means of expressing hopes and
fears, sympathies and hatreds, as well as articulating belief and understanding.’’9
With this discussion in mind, this article uses Heywood’s definition of ideology:
A more or less coherent set of ideas that provides the basis for organized
political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow
the existing system of power. All ideologies therefore, have the following
features:
(a) They offer an account of the existing order, usually in the form
of a ‘world view.’
(b) They advance a model of a desired future, a vision of the ‘good
society.’
(c) They explain how political change can and should be brought
about—how to get from (a) to (b).10
Ideologies, in other words, attempt to make sense of the world around us; they tell us
who we are and who we ought to be. They explain current misery and assign blame
for that misery, blaming false ideas and the leaders that uphold these ideas. Ideolo-
gues provide a vision for (in their eyes) a better world and directions for how to get
there; they describe the elusive path to utopia. Finally, ideologues wrap their mess-
age and their call for action in an air of authenticity, claiming their path to be true,
and therefore infallible.
This understanding of ideology is particularly useful for discerning the message
of Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda’s vision, which builds on several Muslim ideologues of the
20th century, contains a critique of the existing political order in the Muslim world.
It cites weak and corrupt Muslim leadership, its adherents to the false ideologies of
the West, and its support from the West as the malady of the Muslim world. In order
for the Muslim world to be restored, it must return to its true path, which is laid out
in the Qur’an and the Sunnah (the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad).
For Al Qaeda, this return to the right path can only be achieved through a physical
struggle, jihad, against Muslim leadership and the Western powers that support it.
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Al Qaeda’s Ideology—Critiques, Vision, and Means for Change
While some of its tactics and strategies are new—such as attacking the continental
United States with the aim of compelling its withdrawal from the Muslim world—
Al Qaeda’s ideology is not new; it has its roots in several Muslim thinkers from
the 20th century who developed the vision for an Islamic revolution. Building on
the three-part definition of ideology—a critique of the existing order, a vision for
a better world, and the means for achieving that better world—this section outlines
Al Qaeda’s ideology and its historic antecedents. It argues that its critique of the
existing order is not new, its vision for a better world order is vague, and perhaps
its greatest contribution to the evolving ideology is that the United States is directly
attacking the Muslim world—through occupation, war, and support of corrupt
Muslim leadership—and that fighting the United States is an individual obligation
for all Muslims to defend the faith against this imminent threat. Each of these points
will be elaborated on below.
The Critique—The Muslim World is in a State of Crisis
Al Qaeda’s ideology is grounded on the assertion that weak and corrupt Muslim
leadership is to blame for the decline of the Muslim community and that leadership
is weak because it has embraced the West and strayed from the true path of Islam.
Al Qaeda points to events such as the 1967 Six Day War, Israeli occupation of
Palestine, and the presence of foreign troops on Saudi soil and other Muslim lands,
as evidence that Muslim leadership has failed to protect the dar al Islam, the territory
of Islam. Reform is not an option; overthrowing Muslim leadership throughout the
dar al Islam and instilling pious leaders who defend the faith is necessary to counter
this crisis. In other words, an Islamic revolution is the only solution.
Al Qaeda formed in the wake of the Soviet Afghan war of the 1980s with the
goal of spreading jihad throughout the world as a means of toppling secular Muslim
regimes and establishing pious governments in their place. Bin Laden’s primary
target was the Saudi royal family, which he denounced for allowing U.S. troops
to base on Saudi soil in 1991 and for imprisoning several ulama, Muslim scholars,
who disagreed with this decision.11 Bin Laden’s first public statement, ‘‘An Open
Letter to King Fahd,’’ argues that the Saudi government has violated tawhid, the
oneness of God, by creating laws that diverge from God’s laws (Shariah) and joining
forces with human enterprises such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the United
States. The letter argues: ‘‘You have put the Islamic law only at the very end of the
above mentioned list of legislative sources even after the garbage of human thoughts,
norms and traditions of the disbelieving nations and the laws of the disbelieving
regimes.’’12 Bin Laden’s letter draws on the historical precedents of Ibn Taymiyah,13
Ibn Katheer, Sheikh Mohammad bin Ibrahim, and Ibn Hazm, among others, to
argue that the Saudi royal family no longer has authority over the country because
of its breach of tawhid. In 1994, bin Laden founded the Advice and Reconciliation
Committee, which focused almost entirely on criticizing the Saudi regime for failing
to uphold the tenets of the faith.14
Al Qaeda also blames Western ideas and values as corrupting the Muslim world.
Democracy, in particular, is a Western idea that Al Qaeda names as a source of
threat to Islam. Zawahiri, bin Laden’s deputy, goes so far as to call democracy ‘‘a
new religion.’’ He states: ‘‘In Islam, legislation comes from God; in a democracy, this
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capacity is given to the people. Therefore, this is a new religion, based on making the
people into gods and giving them God’s rights and attributes.’’15 Democracy, in
other words, compromises the sovereignty and oneness of God; it places humans
in a position of authority that should only be held by God.
The critique of corrupt Muslim leaderships and their embrace of Western ideas
is a grievance that stretches back almost a century. Hassan al Banna, the founder of
the Muslim Brotherhood, began his Islamic revival as a critique against Muslim
leadership and its failure to lead the community in the right path of the faith. Banna
argued that Egypt—and Muslim society more broadly—was in a state of crisis;
Egyptian society had strayed away from the path of God by investing in Western,
secular ideologies—including both capitalism and socialism—and materialistic pur-
suits. Only by retuning Egyptian society to its true faith and identity—Islam—could
it flourish and shake off Western influence.16
Around the same time as Banna, South Asian Islamic ideologue Sayyid Abul
a’la Mawdudi was equally critical of Muslim leadership and the educated elite, which
he believed had been seduced by the ideas of the West. Mawdudi argued that West-
ern culture and ideas were inherently bankrupt and corrupt. Mawdudi reinterpreted
the term jahiliyyah—a word used to describe the ignorance of the world prior to the
revelation of the Qur’an—to mean the ignorance and deception of Western culture
and ideological thought.17 In the article ‘‘Self-Destructiveness of Western Civiliza-
tion,’’ written in the 1930s, Mawdudi contends that, while Western accomplishments
and political power are ‘‘awe inspiring,’’ the West is destined to fail because of
its arrogance and rebellion against God: ‘‘The miseries of the First World War,
financial breakdowns, ever increasing unemployment, a spectacular rise in sexual
diseases, disintegration of the family system, all of these are very clear indications
for those who have insights to conclude the repercussions of tyranny, disobedience,
lustfulness and dishonesty.’’18 Mawdudi concludes that mimicking the West will
only cause ‘‘backwards and licentious nations’’ to suffer the same fate as the powers
they emulate.19
Sayyid Qutb, perhaps one of the most important 20th century Islamic ideolo-
gues, also blamed the perceived decline of Islam on Muslim leadership, including
religious leaders. Qutb accused these leaders of aping Western ideology, bending
to the will of political authority, and compromising the teachings of Islam. Qutb also
used the term jahiliyyah to describe not only the West but the Muslim world, which
had become lost and corrupted by the ideas of the West and weak Muslim leaders.
Specifically, Qutb called governments that embrace secularism and that give humans
the right to govern over other humans (a role reserved only for the sovereignty of
God) as jahilil.20
It is important not to lose sight of the long-standing critique against Muslim
leadership, both political and religious, as the principal cause of the crisis in Islam
today. Despite Al Qaeda’s focus on the United States as a threat to the Muslim
world, which will be discussed below, corrupt Muslim leadership still remains the
principal problem in Al Qaeda’s ideological critique of the existing order.
The basing of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, following Saddam Hussein’s invasion
of Kuwait in 1991, produced a new argument against the West—that it was directly
attacking the Muslim world and seeking to occupy Islam’s holiest cities, Mecca and
Medina. Bin Laden spearheaded this argument, first through a series of open letters
to the Muslim world, followed by his 1996 declaration of war against the United
States and Israel. In 1998, the Qatari-based satellite news station Al Jazeera
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interviewed bin Laden after the African embassy bombings and U.S. attacks on
Afghanistan and Sudan. Bin Laden asserted:
Our duty—which we have undertaken—is to motivate our ummah to
jihad for the sake of God against America and Israel and their allies.
And we are still doing this, motivating people; the popular mobilization
that happened in these last months is moving in the right direction to
remove the Americans from Muslim countries.21
In his 1998 fatwah, bin Laden goes even further to declare that fighting U.S.
troops and civilians is fard ayn, an individual obligation of all Muslims:
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—
is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country
in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque
[Jerusalem] and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order
for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and
unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words
of Almighty Allah: ‘‘And fight the pagans all together as they fight you
all together,’’ and ‘‘fight them until there is no more tumult or
oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah [Qur’anic
passage].’’22
Al Qaeda’s call for all Muslims to kill Americans, and their allies, is a new addition
to the ideology of the Islamic revolution. Prior arguments—such as Qutb’s—focused
on local Muslim leadership and their corruption by Western ideas. Bin Laden and Al
Qaeda take that argument further, arguing for the need to attack the United States
directly. Their imperative, however, is based not only on the encroachment of West-
ern thoughts and culture, but more specifically on acts that they perceive to be direct
attacks against the Muslim world, including the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi
Arabia, U.S. military operations in Somalia and Bosnia and, more recently, the wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Al Qaeda’s statements and communique´s call for the Muslim world to rise up,
en masse, in order to establish a unified and free ummah that can defeat its enemies,
and that the obligation for Muslims to defend the faith is binding on all. It is a call
for a total Islamic revolution of society, governance, and the faith. Most aspects
of this message are not new but have built on the critiques of previous scholars
and that the ideas of former ideologues have persisted beyond the lives of their
creators.
The Solution—Islam is a Total Way of Life, Return to the Foundation of the Faith
Al Qaeda’s ideology is rooted in the argument of several 20th century scholars that
Islam provides a total way of life and offers complete direction for governance,
economics, and society. Islam’s totality transcends time and space and provides solu-
tions to modern questions for individual and collective life as it has done throughout
the ages. The worldwide Muslim community, the ummah, needs to unify and return
to the foundations of the faith, laid out in the Qur’an and the Sunnah—the sayings
and ways of the Prophet Muhammad—and of his companions.
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Bin Laden described the totality of Islam for modern life in a 1997 interview with
CNN reporter Peter Arnett:
We are an ummah [unified Muslim community], and have a long history
with the grace of God. We are now in the 15th century of this great
religion, whose complete and comprehensive methodology has clarified
the dealing between one individual and another, the duties of the believer
toward God, and the relationship between the Muslim community and
other countries in times of peace and war.23
Bin Laden’s argument for the totality of Islam for modern life has its roots in the
ideas of Mawdudi and Qutb. Mawdudi asserted that Muslim society could only
be restored to its strength and totality by returning to Islam, which offers a com-
plete template for spiritual, social, political, and economic life. He further argued
that it is the government’s responsibility to direct society on the right path of the
faith. Westernized Muslim elites had led the community astray and pious
Muslims need to provide an alternative to their leadership.24 Mawdudi
envisioned a state governed by an ‘‘Islamic system’’ that upheld Shariah law in
its totality and managed spiritual, familial, social, economic, and political
relations. The model for the Islamic system is the first Muslim community, the
Prophet and the first four Caliphs, which governed the unified ummah and pro-
pagated the faith.25 Ultimately, the Islamic system would recognize hakimiyah
and tawhid, the sovereignty and oneness of God, undivided by human innovation
and ambition.
Sayyid Qutb built on the arguments of Banna and Mawdudi, further
stressing the authenticity of Islam’s message for life. Qutb wrote extensively
on an authentic Islamic ideology that would not only replace the secular ideol-
ogies of capitalism, communism, and nationalism, but would surpass their moral
bankruptcy and provide a true and complete way of life.26 Qutb also argued that
it was the government’s role to provide the moral framework and instruction
that would lead Muslim societies out of jahiliyyah and into the right path of
Islam. Qutb devised a four-stage process for realizing a pious government, based
on the early experiences of the Prophet: the creation of a jamaah, or group of
individuals committed to a true Islamic society and polity; the necessary
persecution of the jamaah by the unfaithful; the hijrah, or separation of the jam-
mahi from society; and then victory and consolidation of power.27 Ultimately,
Qutb asserted that the goal of humanity is to submit to the sovereignty of
God; the detailed workings and bureaucracy of the state were not a concern
to Qutb.28
In addition to returning to the true path of Islam, Al Qaeda’s ideology also
dismisses the concept of the state as unauthentic and calls for the unification of
the ummah, the worldwide Muslim community to overcome the threats it faces.
Bin Laden’s declaration of war most clearly demonstrates the call for reunifica-
tion. Bin Laden argues that fighting to liberate Saudi Arabia and Jerusalem
from non-Muslim hands is a necessary first step, but that the ultimate goal is
the reunification of the ummah: ‘‘This is the time to be firm, so be firm and
know that your unity and cooperation for the liberation of the Islamic holy
places is a sound step toward the unification of the nation’s ranks under the
banner of one God.’’29
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Zawahiri also argues for the need to unify the ummah, adding the return of the
Khalifa, one pious leader who can defend the dar al Islam, to his argument:
Liberating the Muslim nation, confronting the enemies of Islam, and
launching jihad against them require a Muslim authority, established
on a Muslim land that raises the banner of jihad and rallies the Muslims
around it. Without achieving this goal our actions will mean nothing
more than mere and repeated disturbances that will not lead to the
aspired goal, which is the restoration of the caliphate and the dismissal
of the invaders from the land of Islam. This goal must remain the basic
objective of the Islamic jihad movement, regardless of the sacrifices and
the time involved.30
Similar to his argument against democracy, Zawahiri’s critique of the state system
stems from its Western origins and the way that states artificially divide the ummah.
Zawahiri’s imperative for reunification is more pragmatic than bin Laden’s
statements, calling for the Muslim masses to wake up, return to the true path of
Islam, and band together as necessary conditions for expelling enemies from the
territory of Islam, both domestic and foreign.31 Taken together, Al Qaeda’s call
for reunification fills both a spiritual and a pragmatic purpose.
The desire to reunify the ummah is also stressed in Al Qaeda’s predecessors and
other contemporaries, but perhaps on a more mystical than a pragmatic level. Qutb,
for example, describes the goal of Islam as worldwide unity:
This religion is not a declaration for the liberation of the Arab man! It is
not a message restricted to the Arabs . . . Its object is ‘‘man,’’ the
‘‘human’’ genus—its scope is the ‘‘world’’ . . . the whole world. God is
not the Lord of the Arabs alone not even those who believe in the Islamic
doctrine alone . . . God is the ‘‘Lord of the worlds’’ and this religion seeks
to restore ‘‘the world’’ to its lord and extricate people from bondage
to anyone save Him. The greatest bondage—in the view of Islam—is
subservience to human laws legislated by humans.32
Whereas Qutb described the universally salvific power of God’s message for all of
humanity, bin Laden and Zawahiri appear to be calling for a more literal
unification of the ummah as a means of consolidating power to defend the dar al
Islam. Moreover, Al Qaeda asserts the need for transnational unity that transcends
the state system and creates a defensive barrier against Western influence. Qutb calls
for a new government but still appears to work within the state system. Nevertheless,
the goal of transnational unity of the ummah is a theme that is not new to the Muslim
world or to the Islamic revival more specifically.
It is important to note that Al Qaeda’s priority of reunifying the ummah and
transcending all earthly barriers—national, ethnic, sect, and class—is not shared
by all jihadi groups today. Palestinian Islamic jihadi groups, such as Hamas and
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, continue to have specific nationalists objectives—the
creation of a Palestinian state—in addition to Islamic goals. Likewise, the Lebanese
Shia Hizbollah has both sectarian goals as well as more general Islamic pursuits.
Therefore, Al Qaeda’s vision for one monolithic ummah, while appealing as a
spiritual goal, is not universally held by all jihadis today.33
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The Means for Realizing the New World
Al Qaeda’s goals are consistent with a growing movement in the Muslim world
called Salafi.34 Salafi advocate a strict adherence to tawhid (the oneness of God),
reject interpretations of the scripture, and call for literally following the Qur’an
and Sunna, as they believe the companions of the Prophet Mohammad (al salaf al
salahiya) did. Although united in their goals of the oneness of God and the literal
word of scripture, Salafi are divided over strategies for realizing this interpretation
of the faith. Political scientist Quintan Wictorowicz argues that three sub-sets of
Salafi exist based on differing views of how to achieve a pure, Islamic society: jihadis,
who contend that violence is necessary; politicos, who believe that working through
the political system can affect change; and purists, who stress the need for transform-
ing society apart from violence and politics, which are divisive and distract from the
true goals of the faith.35
Al Qaeda clearly falls in the jihadi’s camp; their message contends that the neces-
sary path for change requires physical struggle, or the ‘‘lesser jihad,’’ and that jihad
becomes a pillar of Islam.36 For Al Qaeda, jihad is more than just a tactic or strategy;
it is a theological imperative, binding on all Muslims. Zawahiri, in particular, argues
for the necessity of jihad to restore Islam to its proper place. In his memoirs, Knights
Under the Prophet’s Banner, Zawahiri contends that ‘‘no solution is possible without
jihad,’’ and ‘‘jihad is the only solution.’’37 Zawahiri further writes in Knights Under
the Prophet’s Banner that not only is jihad ‘‘the only solution,’’ but that, tactically,
the focus must ‘‘concentrate on martyrdom operations as the most successful way of
inflicting damage on the opponent and the least costly to the mujahedeen in terms of
casualties.’’38 Zawahiri stresses: ‘‘Be sure to inflict maximum casualties on the
enemy, kill the greatest number of people, for this is the language understood by
the West, no matter how much time and effort such operations take.’’39 As both a
strategy and a tactic, suicide bombing has the multi-prong objective of striking fear
into the hearts of its opponents, and waking up the ummah to the urgency of the
crisis at hand.
Zawahiri asserts the necessity of jihad by pointing to historic examples of
Islamic movements that have tried non-violent means of changing the status quo,
but have failed, such as the FIS in Algeria: ‘‘It wanted to use the ballot boxes in a
bid to reach the presidential palaces and ministries, but at the gates tanks were
waiting, loaded with French ammunition, their barrels pointing at those who had
forgotten the rules of the battle between justice and falsehood.’’40 He also devotes
an entire essay, ‘‘Bitter Harvest,’’ to condemning the methods of the Muslim
Brotherhood, which has tried to work with Muslim governments to bring people
back to the faith.41
Bin Laden also asserts the necessity of jihad. In a 1997 CNN interview with Peter
Arnett, he states:
. . . the effect of jihad has been great not only at the level of the Islamic
movement but also at the level of the Muslim nation in the whole world.
The spirit of power, dignity, and confidence has grown in our sons and
brothers for this religion and the power of God. And it has become
apparent even to the Islamic movement that there is no choice but to
return to the original source, to this religion, to God’s Book, and to
the sunna of His Prophet, as understood by our predecessors, may God
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be pleased with them. Of this, the peak of this religion is jihad. The nation
has had a strong conviction that there is no way to obtain faithful
strength but by returning to this jihad.42
Despite the attention paid to Al Qaeda’s use of suicide bombings and emphasis
on jihad, its argument for the necessity of jihad has its antecedents in previous
Muslim thinkers. Qutb is often cited as the ideological father of modern day
jihad and of Al Qaeda.43 In Milestones, Qutb attacks the notion of defensive jihad
undertaken to defend the territory of Islam, stressing instead the need for jihad to
free Muslims and all men from the bonds of ignorance:
The reasons for jihad . . . are these: to establish God’s authority in the
earth; to arrange human affairs according to the true guidance provided
by God; to abolish all the Satanic forces and Satanic systems of life; to
end the lordship of one man over others, since all men are creatures of
God and no one has the authority to make them his servants or to make
arbitrary laws for them. These are the reasons sufficient for proclaiming
jihad.44
Qutb goes on to claim that these conditions are ongoing on the earth, and therefore
require perpetual jihad.45
Building on the writings of Qutb, Egyptian activist Abd al-Salaman al
Faraj called for Muslims to violently defend the faith against the Sadat regime in
his booklet The Neglected Duty, circulated in the late 1970s.46 Faraj argues that jihad
was the forgotten duty of Muslims and that force is not only necessary but also
required for all Muslims to defend and purify the faith from the threat of corrupt
Muslim leadership and secularism. Faraj states:
With regard to the lands of Islam the enemy lives right in the middle of
them. The enemy even has got hold of the reins of power, for this enemy
is (none other than) these rulers who have (illegally) seized the Leadership
of the Muslims. Therefore, waging jihad against them is an individual
duty, in addition to the fact that Islamic jihad today requires a drop of
sweat from every Muslim. Know that when jihad is an individual duty,
there is no (need to) ask permission of (your) parents to leave to wage
jihad, as the jurists have said; it is similar to prayer and fasting.47
Bin Laden’s mentor, Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, also argued for the necessity of
physical jihad against the adversary. In ‘‘Martyrs: The Building Blocks of Nations,’’
Azzam elevates jihad and martyrdom to a new level, contending that: ‘‘The life of
the Muslim ummah is solely dependent on the ink of its scholars and the blood of
its martyrs.’’ Azzam goes on to argue that: ‘‘Indeed those who think that they can
change reality, or change societies, without blood, sacrifices and invalids [sic],
without pure, innocent souls, then they do not understand the essence of this deen
(religion).’’48
Bin Laden and Zawahiri also argue that a top-down revolution that seizes the
power of the state is necessary in order to successfully bring Muslims back to
the right path.49 Zawahiri, in particular, has articulated a strategy that involves
gathering a small force, what he calls the ‘‘jihad vanguard,’’50 which would drive
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out Western influence and overthrow Muslim governments through jihad: ‘‘Small
groups can spread fear among the Americans . . . It is always possible to track an
American or a Jew, to kill him with a bullet or a knife, a simple explosive device,
or a blow with an iron rod . . . With the means available, small groups can spread
terror among Americans and Jews.’’51 Zawahiri goes on to argue: ‘‘The jihad move-
ment must follow a plan aimed at establishing an Islamic state it can defend on a
territory in the Muslim world; from there, it will lead the struggle to restore the
rightly guided caliphate after the Prophet’s model.’’52 Zawahiri also notes that, ulti-
mately, transforming the population is the jihad movement’s goal: ‘‘In short, the
jihad movement must enter the battle in midst of the community and lead it to
the battle field. It must guard against isolating itself from its community in an elitist
battle against the authorities.’’53 Seizing the government is thus a means to the ulti-
mate goal of bringing everyone back to the right interpretation of the faith. This pro-
cess requires a trained, committed, focused core that can drive the transformation in
the right direction.
However, not all within the Al Qaeda movement agree on a top-down approach;
there are advocates who argue for a bottom-up approach for realizing the global
jihad, which is an important innovation in Al Qaeda thinking. Brynjar Lia’s biogra-
phy on Abu Mus’ab al-Suri—a purported new generation of thinkers in Al Qaeda—
sheds light on a strategist with a different approach for realizing Al Qaeda’s vision.
According to Lia, al-Suri concurs with Al Qaeda’s broad goal of freeing the Muslim
world from foreign occupation, overturning corrupt Muslim leaders, and unifying
the ummah.54 Al-Suri argues, however, that Al Qaeda is only one part of a greater
Muslim uprising and that its most important contribution to the Muslim world is
its ideology, which provides solidarity and encouragement.55 In order to realize a
unified ummah free of corrupt leadership, Muslims should take a much more rational
approach to achieving this goal and develop a long-term strategy that builds on the
lessons learned from jihadis and other, non-Muslim insurgents.56 Al-Suri further
argues that the global Muslim uprising should not be driven by organizations, but
rather by ‘‘systems,’’ or independent groups and individuals inspired by Al Qaeda’s
ideology and loyal to its vision.57 In other words, the top-down vanguard is
unnecessary; the approach should be bottom-up and united only by the vision to
establish a new Muslim order through jihad.
Another important difference with Al Qaeda and its associates is the debate on
what to attack first and why. Zawahiri and bin Laden proposed a strategy that
requires Muslims to attack the ‘‘far enemy’’—namely the United States, as a neces-
sary first step for toppling the ‘‘near enemy,’’ U.S.-backed local Muslim regimes.58
Their strategy asserts that, once the far enemy has withdrawn its support, the near
enemy will be easier to conquer, paving the way for pious Muslim leadership. In
his 1998 Al Jazeera interview, bin Laden responds to questions about U.S. and
British air strikes against Iraq in Operation Desert Fox:
. . . the time has come for Muslim people to realize after these attacks
[Desert Fox] that the states of the region do not have their own sover-
eignty. For our enemies disporting themselves in our seas and on our
lands and in our airspace, striking without anyone’s permission . . . but
these other regimes, they no longer have any real power. They are either
colluding with America and Britain or have lost the power to do anything
against this barefaced occupation.59
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Bin Laden’s statement suggests that Western powers, specifically the United States,
Britain, and Israel are preventing jihadis from toppling Muslim regimes; no change
can come without attacking this enemy first and compelling its withdrawal.60
In Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, Zawahiri argues that a global conspiracy
consisting of ‘‘the United Nations; the servile rulers of the Muslim peoples; multina-
tional corporations; international news agencies and satellite media channels;
international relief agencies and nongovernmental organizations, which are used
as a cover for espionage, conspiracies, proselytizing and arms smuggling,’’ is attack-
ing Islam.61 Zawahiri repeatedly stresses that the international conspiracy needs to
be attacked first and that it is important to ‘‘reemphasize that at this stage focusing
on the domestic enemy alone would be pointless.’’62 Zawahiri goes on to argue that,
in the face of this multi-pronged threat against Islam, a counter-coalition is forming
that will drive this threat out of the dar al Islam. ‘‘It is a growing force that is rallying
under the banner of jihad, against the scope of the new world order. This force is free
of the servitude to the dominant Western imperialism and promises destruction
and ruin to the new crusades against the land of Islam.’’63
In order to compel the retreat of the far enemy, Al Qaeda has made three broad
arguments for what to target—the economy, the military, and average citizens—
these are new contributions to the evolving ideology of revolutionary Islam. Bin
Laden’s first target was the U.S. economy. The logic behind this target appears to
be that economic might not only translates into military power, but is a coercive
force in and of itself; hitting economic targets is thus a necessary means of weakening
a force that is preventing the Muslim world from realizing social and political
change.
At the beginning of the 1991 Gulf War, bin Laden called for all Muslims to boy-
cott U.S. goods and products as a symbol of resistance to U.S. power.64 The zenith
of this strategy was Al Qaeda’s efforts to target the U.S. economy through attacking
the World Trade Center. Following the attacks, bin Laden defended his actions:
As for the World Trade Towers, the ones who were attacked and who
died in it were part of a financial power. It wasn’t a children’s school!
Neither was it a residence. And the general consensus is that most of
the people who were in the towers were men that backed the biggest
financial force in the world, which spreads mischief throughout the
world.65
The Terrorism Perspectives Project reports that strategists, such as Al-Qurashi and
Al- Hilali, have continued to identify the economy as the United States’ ‘‘center of
gravity,’’ meaning its source of strength and thus the principal object of attack.66
Along with economic targets, bin Laden’s earliest writing argued for attacking
the U.S. military as a means of compelling their withdrawal from the Muslim world.
Bin Laden draws from several historic examples to argue the effectiveness of
this strategy, including the mujahidin’s victory over the Soviets in Afghanistan,
the withdrawal of U.S. forces after the Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon, and
particularly the removal of U.S. forces in Somalia after 19 soldiers were killed.
Bin Laden states:
The U.S. government went [to Somalia] with great pride and stayed there
for some time, wanting to frighten them [and show] that they are the
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greatest power on earth. It went there with pride and with over 28,000
soldiers, to fight a poor unarmed people . . . Resistance started against
the U.S. invasion because Muslims do not believe U.S allegations that
they came to save the Somalis . . . With God’s grace, Muslims over there
cooperated with some Arab mujahidin who were in Afghanistan. They
participated with their brothers in Somalia against the American
occupation troops and killed large numbers of them . . . After a little
resistance, the American troops left after achieving nothing. They left
after claiming that they were the largest power on earth. They left after
some resistance from powerless, poor, unarmed people whose only
weapon is the belief in God Almighty, and who do not fear the fabricated
American lives.67
Again, bin Laden states:
We believe that America is much weaker than Russia, and we have
learned from our brothers who fought in the jihad in Somalia of the
incredible weakness and cowardice of the American solider. Not even
eighty of them had been killed and they fled in total darkness in the mid-
dle of the night, unable to see a thing.68
Some of Al Qaeda’s earliest attacks were directed against U.S. military targets, such
as the USS Cole in Yemen.
Bin Laden has further expanded his hit list to include all U.S. citizens, arguing
that they pay taxes and elect the president of the United States and therefore are
responsible for the president’s policies:
Every American is our adversary, whether he fights directly or he pays
taxes. Perhaps you have heard the recent news that three-quarters of
the American people support Clinton in attacking Iraq. This is a people
whose votes are won when innocents dies, whose leader commits adultery
and great sins and then sees his popularity rise—a vile people who have
never understood the meaning of values.69
More recently, the strategy of targeting civilians has come under attack from other
Islamic revolutionaries. Following more than a decade in prison, members of the
Egyptian Gaamat drafted a series of books critiquing jihadis’ use of force to change
the political and social status quo, including Al Qaeda’s use of violence. The authors
criticize, in particular, targeting U.S. civilians based on their democratic partici-
pation in governance. The authors conclude that this is an erroneous interpretation
of the laws that govern jihad and they are not legitimate targets.70 In 2007, Egyptian
Islamic Jihad followed with a similar renunciation of violence and critique of Al
Qaeda’s theology and tactics.71
In addition to targeting the far enemy to compel its withdrawal, Al Qaeda and
its affiliates have also proposed strategies for dealing with domestic leaders and way-
ward Muslims. Abu Bakr Naji has proposed that operations should not focus on
toppling domestic governments—either by attacking them first or hitting the states
that support them—but that the goal should be creating ungoverned spaces, what
he calls ‘‘administrations of savagery’’ in which jihadis can organize, train, and
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operate.72 Jihadis can create these administrations of savagery by first attacking
critical economic assets in a country, which will require a country’s forces to double
up protection on these sites. This, in turn, will create security vacuums in other
areas from which jihadis can set up government-like structures, gain strength, and
‘‘manage savagery,’’ which will win populations over. The ideological goal is still
the same—to spread revolutionary Islam—but the strategy for reaching this
ideological goal differs from bin Laden’s and Zawahiri’s focus on the far enemy.
There is evidence that Naji’s strategy is gaining ground in certain jihadi circles. In
2008, Saudi Arabia, for example, arrested hundreds of jihad, some of which were
claiming to implement Naji’s strategy.73
Perhaps the most controversial target for attack in revolutionary Islam has been
fellow Muslims. Bin Laden cites the 14th century scholar Ibn Taymiyah as an
example of legal justification for attacking corrupt Muslim leadership—in
Taymiyah’s case the Mongols and Muslim scholars who allowed for what Taymiyah
deemed innovative practices—and, in so doing, targeting fellow Muslims.74 Faraj
also cites Taymiyah to make an argument for the permissibility of killing fellow
Muslims, including corrupt Muslim leaders and individual Muslims who may be
in an adversary’s military.75
However, more recent attacks reveal that targeting and killing fellow Muslims,
especially average citizens, is not winning people over to Al Qaeda’s vision; in fact it
is turning them against the movement. This is particularly true of the November
2005 series of suicide attacks in Amman, Jordan that killed over 60 people, mostly
Muslim. The attack, coordinated by Jordanian-born Al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu
Musab Al Zarqawi, was meant to target foreign diplomats in Western hotels, but
ended up killing mostly Muslims, including nearly 40 Muslims attending a wedding
party. The attacks prompted protests in the streets condemning the acts.76 The
demise of Al Qaeda in Iraq is also attributed to its use of brutality against Iraqi
Sunnis, including the movement’s assassination of a prominent tribal Sheikh in
2007.77 Recent U.S. intelligence forecasting suggests that Al Qaeda is on the decline,
‘‘having alienated Muslim supporters with indiscriminate killing and inattention to
the practical problems of poverty, unemployment and education.’’78
There is also evidence to suggest that, among certain ranks identifying with the
Al Qaeda movement, jihad is the ends, not the means, of the battle. The Terrorist
Perspectives Project distinguishes between what they call the ‘‘strategists’’ and the
‘‘foot soldiers’’ in Al Qaeda. Communique´s between strategists reveal considerable
frustration over foot soldiers’ lack of strategic vision and their ‘‘thirst for
martyrdom.’’79 The tendency to think of jihad as the ends, not the means, to a great-
er struggle—the creation of a rightly guided Islamic state—has prompted foot sol-
diers to take actions that repel fellow Muslims from supporting the Al Qaeda
movement. This is particularly true of attacks against other Muslims or attacks
where Muslims become ‘‘collateral damage,’’ such as the November 2005 Amman
hotel bombings. Thus, while some foot soldiers treat jihad and suicide operations
as the goal of their struggle, they do not reflect the ideological aspirations of the
broader Al Qaeda movement.
The ideology of revolutionary Islam did not begin with Al Qaeda. The seeds of
this vision began almost a century ago with ideas of Banna, and later Mawdudi,
Qutb, Faraj, and Azzam. These ideas have persisted beyond the lives of their creators
and have gone on to inspire new ideologues and different strategies and tactics for
realizing a new social and political order based on a strict interpretation of the faith.
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The resilience of revolutionary Islam, and the various tactics and strategies it
inspires, suggests that targeting groups or even their leaders will not get at the root
of the problem, which is the ideology itself. Countering Al Qaeda, therefore, needs to
focus on eroding a narrative that is nearly a century in the making.
Fighting the Jihad of the Pen
The United States has focused primarily on dismantling Al Qaeda as an organiza-
tion, capturing or killing its leaders, and taking defensive measures aimed at securing
the homeland and U.S. interest abroad from terrorist attacks. The U.S. continues
to fight Al Qaeda as a unique and discrete organization, proposing a new phase of
counter-terrorism measures that target Al Qaeda’s leadership in the tribal areas of
Pakistan.80 Comparatively, the U.S. government has committed only a fraction
of time and treasure to specifically targeting the message of revolutionary Islam,
attempting strategic communications programs, radio and television programs, and
websites.81
Countering the message of revolutionary Islam requires, first, understanding the
persisting themes of the message and why these messages resonate with at least some
in the Muslim world: the vision for a better world and the means for achieving this
new reality. Each of these subcomponents of ideology offers different opportunities
for countermeasures. The article concludes by proposing different ways of counter-
ing revolutionary Islam, arguing that the best means for undermining ideology is to
offer an alternative vision, one that is more appealing or more attainable than either
the status quo or the vision of revolutionary Islam.
The previous discussion delineated several key points about the grievances of
revolutionary Islam. First, despite the evolution of the ideology of revolutionary
Islam from the 1920s, the problem that ideologues name with the current state of
society and politics has remained surprisingly constant. Banna, Qutb, Mawdudi,
and Faraj all describe a crisis in Muslim society caused by weak and corrupt leader-
ship that has embraced false ideologies and strayed from the true path of the faith.
Within this, Al Qaeda has also blamed the West, and particularly the United States,
for supporting these regimes and meddling in the Muslim world. However, the
critique of the existing order is not just about the United States. The ideology has
a deeper critique about the crisis of the Muslim community and the need for pious
Muslim leadership that upholds the tenets of Islam.
Revolutionary Islam’s solution to these problems is simple and unspecific. Islam
is the solution. Ideologues ranging from Banna to bin Laden call for placing Islam in
the forefront of society and governance and reuniting the ummah into one body of the
faithful. With the exception of Mawdudi, ideologues have committed very little ink
to actually describing what the new political order would look like and how pious
leadership would be cultivated and identified. Instead, most ideologues harkened
back to the first four caliphs as the model of leadership and community, flattening
the many disagreements and disunity during this time.
Revolutionary Islam’s simple solution has also produced a variety of means for
realizing a new social and political world based on Islam. Strategies for seizing power
and transforming the Muslim world range from a bottom-up, non-violent, gradual
awakening of the ummah, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, to a top-down, violent
overthrow of the state by an Islamic vanguard and the forced withdrawal of U.S.
sponsorship through terrorist acts, typified by Al Qaeda.
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The consistency of grievances in revolutionary Islam seems to suggest that
this would be the best avenue for undercutting the ideology of revolutionary Islam.
However, addressing these grievances is no small task and the United States has at
best limited policy options. First, the grievances run the gamut from corrupt Muslim
leadership to the erosion of Islam in public life to U.S. meddling in the Muslim
world. The range and nature of these grievances does not suggest viable policy
solutions. What does ‘‘pious’’ Muslim leadership look like and can everyone agree
on a definition of pious leadership? Would it be enough to have the United States
withdraw its troops from the Muslim world or would the end of U.S. influence also
need to include separation from Israel, economic isolation, and the end of cultural
influences such as movies, television, and music? What does the ‘‘right’’ application
of Islam in public life look like and who determines that? Questions such as these
imply that attacking grievances would be never-ending, for both the United States
and various Muslim countries.
Similarly, the previous discussion demonstrates that Islamic revolutionaries have
employed a variety of means for realizing the new social, political, and religious
order. Groups that employ violence, especially terrorism, would seem the likely
target for counter-ideology efforts. However, groups that use non-violent means,
even the democratic process, still carry the same ideological goals—the return of
Islam to the forefront of society and government and the consolidation of the
ummah, a vision that threatens to flatten the diversity within Islam and to exclude
non-Muslims from full participation in society and politics.82 There is evidence to
suggest that allowing groups to run in elections, properly managed, could create
the conditions for these groups to learn debate, compromise, and modify their
vision.83 However, there is also evidence to suggest that participating in elections
alone does not modify a group. Hamas and Hizbollah are examples of groups that
have participated in elections, but have only partially modified their domestic goals
and continue to maintain militant wings.
Of the three avenues mentioned above for fighting the ideology, challenging the
vision for a better world promised by revolutionary Islam is the best means for
fighting the ideology. Ultimately, ideologies are countered through competing
worldviews that offer hope and a better vision for how to live. Communism as an
ideology failed because, juxtaposed against the freedom and prosperity of liberalism,
it did not live up to its utopian promises.84 Similarly, the utopian promises of a
radically egalitarian and free society based on a specific and unambiguous under-
standing of Islam will most likely not live up to its promises. There is already
evidence of this in Iran, where different interest groups—including women’s
organizations—supported the Ayatollah and his vision of revolutionary Islam only
to find that their rights had been marginalized by a restrictive interpretation of Islamic
law. Following the revolution, women’s groups have been some of the most outspoken
critics of the Islamic republic and agitators for reform.85 Revolutionary Islam cannot
live up to its promises and this is an opportunity to undermine its message.
The U.S. government has a limited but important role in fighting this ideology.
Directly confronting Al Qaeda’s message is unlikely to work because the United
States lacks credibility and is not trusted by large portions of the Muslim world;
the message and the messenger need to come from a credible source in order to be
believed.86 Moreover, a new vision for how to understand Islam in the modern world
and its role in society and politics will most likely need to come from within the
ummah. However, the United States has at least two strategies it can pursue in
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fighting revolutionary Islam’s ideas: helping to magnify the divisions and inconsis-
tencies within revolutionary Islam and helping to create the space and culture of
debating ideas.
Exposing the inconsistencies in revolutionary Islam is an important first step for
undercutting the vision. One possible means of doing this is to indirectly magnify the
infighting between revolutionary Islamic groups, like the infighting between Al
Qaeda and Gamaat, and Al Qaeda and EIJ. These squabbles reveal the vagueness
of their vision for a better world. Any opportunity to expose the lack of unity within
these movements opens the way for debate over their message and the path for
realizing revolutionary Islam. Academics and think tanks in the United States have
a role to play in perpetuating these divisions. The Combating Terrorism Center
(CTC) at West Point, for example, has written extensively on the ideological and
operational vulnerabilities of Al Qaeda, including infighting between leaders and
groups. These reports are posted on CTC’s website, along with primary documents
generated by Al Qaeda itself, and are available to anyone. These reports are impor-
tant for exposing critical debates within jihadi circles, and the Muslim world more
broadly, over the right to kill fellow Muslims and the progress that Al Qaeda has
actually made in achieving its goals. In 2008, Zawahiri denounced the works of
CTC as fraudulent and erroneous, suggesting that he felt compelled to challenge
their accusations.87
Another important step for challenging the vision of revolutionary Islam is to
develop competing ideologies and create the space in which these ideas can be fos-
tered and promoted, such as the ‘‘marketplace of ideas’’ that helped shape the ideol-
ogy of liberal democracy and rule of law in the United States. A marketplace of ideas
could serve the dual purpose of exposing the inconsistencies of revolutionary Islam’s
vision for a new world, and offering a place for competing visions to be heard.
Creating a marketplace of ideas requires at least two different components.
First, a marketplace of ideas demands an intellectual culture of questioning and
debate. Implicitly, a culture of questioning and debates rests on the assumption that
ontological claims are not infallible nor are the authorities that purport them.
Individuals need to be taught how to think, not what to think. Furthermore, this
culture requires presenting an uncensored spectrum of opinions, ranging from the
moderate to the extreme, and the right to agree and disagree with various opinions.
This culture of debate comes from both formal education—schooling—and informal
education, such as debates presented on television and in newspapers. This is a
big undertaking that takes time and constant cultivation from individuals and
governments in order to develop.
Second, a marketplace of ideas requires a forum in which ideas can be discussed
and debated. Historically, civic space—town hall meetings, free associations,
non-governmental universities, and other places where people could collect—served
as a space where ideas could be exchanged. However, virtual spaces also act as
important forums for sharing ideas, including newspapers, television and, more
recently, the internet. Nineteenth century scholar Alexis de Tocqueville goes so far
as to call newspapers a unique form of association, claiming that ‘‘nothing but a
newspaper can drop the same thought into a thousand minds at the same
moment.’’88 Physical spaces may be limited or non-existent in the Muslim world,
particularly in more authoritative regimes in which civic space and the freedom of
assembly have been restricted. Virtual meeting spaces, however, provide a possible
alternative. More recently, chat rooms and internet blog sites have become
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important tools for countering extremists’ messages. In Saudi Arabia, for example,
the Al Sakinah program aims to draw extremists into dialogue and debate with
religious scholars and former jihadis over extremist ideas. The very act of debating
extremist ideas opens the possibility for alternative viewpoints and doubt. The pro-
gram is credited with helping to promote a ‘‘middle way’’ between extremism and
secularism.89
These two components of a marketplace of ideas—civic space and a culture of
debate—are both necessary conditions for ideas to develop and prosper. Creating
civic space alone is not sufficient for change; it could provide the forum for extremist
groups to spread their ideology and propagate. Only can these groups be checked if
there is also an intellectual culture in which all ideas are regarded as suspect and
worthy of debate, and that truths—if they exist at all—are not fixed in time but must
be constantly reevaluated, as well as the leaders that generate them.
The United States government has an important role to play in indirectly
fostering a marketplace of ideas; specifically it should focus more on creating the
space where competing ideologies can be debated and forced to compete with one
another. The CTC is an example of a forum where ideas are being debated; their
critique of Al Qaeda compelled Zawahiri to respond to the accusations being leveled
against them. The CTC, in other words, drew Zawahiri into a debate that forced
him to compete with other ideas. This should be the goal in countering Al Qaeda’s
message—creating competition with other visions for how to live a Muslim life.
One avenue for the United States government to create this space is to better
leverage its academic institutions and centers as places where Islamic ideologies
can be proposed and debated by providing resources such as space and money. The
U.S government has already undertaken initiatives with this goal in mind. The
Department of State runs the ‘‘Guidance for Tomorrow’s Leaders Scholarships,’’
which aims to identify and foster leadership in youth foreign countries, specifically
the Middle East and North Africa, through education and volunteering.90 The
U.S. Department of State has also created the Middle East Partnership Initiative,
which aims to provide funding and assistance to organizations that foster civil
society, women’s initiatives, economic development, and programs that educate
youth.91 These programs are important first steps for bolstering initiatives in the
Muslim world that can foster a culture of debate and critical thinking. The goal
of this approach should be to challenge and compel thinkers from different perspec-
tives to debate ideas, to draw them in and force them to better articulate their vision
for a new world. Compelling debate on this topic will further expose the inconsisten-
cies of revolutionary Islam’s ideology.
Along side U.S. government initiatives to foster civic space and debate, other
countries have held conferences aimed at debating Islam’s role in modernity and
Islamic militancy. In particular, the country of Qatar has held a number of confer-
ences aimed at discussing current day issues regarding Islam, including a conference
on Islam and Cultural Heritage, a symposium on Islamic art, interfaith conferences,
and a dialogue on Islamic sects. While these conferences are not specifically about
violent extremism, they discuss various topics that emphasize the diversity in Islam,
and the need for dialogue and intellectual investigation.92
The United States government should avoid directly confronting revolutionary
Islam, directly sponsoring alternate visions, or trying to create their own competing
ideologies. As previously stated, the United States lacks credibility in the Muslim
world, which will hinder the chances of these ideologies prospering. But, perhaps
Countering Revolutionary Islam’s Ideology 309
more importantly, this strategy reinforces a powerful stream of thought in revol-
utionary Islam’s ideology—that Western ideas are trying to weaken and undermine
Islam. Therefore, directly countering revolutionary Islam with a new ideology—
apart from the United States’ lack of credibility—is unlikely to work.
Countering an ideology that has persisted for nearly a decade will most likely
take time and patience. While a new Islamic vision for the future needs to come from
within Islam, the United States still has an important role to play in its unfolding,
particularly in creating the space where these discussions can be debated and a
new vision can emerge.
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